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IS 
Gene "Therapy": A Test Case for 
Research with Children 
M. Therese Lysaught, Ph.D. 
THE CULTURAL FACE of gene therapy is that of a child. The ima~e of a 
child has served as the secular icon of the mystery and promises of 
human gene transfer since its inception in 1990. 1 The particular ~ace 
of the child changes, determined by the mess~ge t~ be commurncat-
ed. It is the face of Ashanti De Silva, her identity long obscured 
behind the veil of confidentiality, who at four years old was the fi~st \ 
subject enrolled in a human gene trans~er protocol with therapeutic 
intent. Her identity revealed after years m the proto~ol, she stands as 
a symbol of hope and promise. It is a countenance hke that of ]~cob 
Sontag, his worried face gracing t~e cover of the N~w York Tzmes 
Magazine drawing observers attention to the desperat10n of parents 
' r 2I . h . and faith in the salvific powers of human gene trans1er. t 1s_t e u~age 
of an Amish child, floating surreally in a vivid sea of ultrav101.et hg~~ · 
pointing to the numinous power of human .gene transf~r and its ab1h-
ty to transcend the most intransigent of social b~undanes. 3 
Those familiar with the history of human subjects research and the 
controversies surrounding recombinant DNA in the late 1970~ ~nd 
1980s ought to find this iconography of particular interest. For 1.t is a 
striking phenomenon: the emergence of a? entirely new modah~ of 
clinical intervention, methods un~ested, nsks ~nkno~n yet publicly 
feared whose earliest human subjects were children. Moreover, as 
iconic: these images often function to foresta.11 criti9ue, to displace . 
argument, to garner public support-and public momes-for human 
gene transfer research. . . . . 
Despite the high visibility of children m the develop~ent an~ justi-
fication of the field of human gene transfer, the topic remams an 
"orphan issue."5 A full examination of the use of child subjects in 
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human gene transfer research remains beyond the scope of this essay.6 
Such an account would attend to questions such as: How did this come 
to pass? What social, political, and/or rhetorical factors account for the 
fact that children were enrolled in human gene transfer so early in the 
development of such a controversial field, in fact in only the second 
clinical trial? How many children have been enrolled in clinical trials 
of human gene transfer? What have these trials entailed? How have 
these protocols fitted with the federal regulations and federal and pro-
fessional policies governing the use of child subjects in research? 
Two recent events suggest the timeliness of the investigation. First, 
there is increasing public pressure to enroll children as subjects in 
clinical trials. In November 1998, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) announced a major change in the rules governing the process 
by which pharmaceutical companies will receive approval for new 
medications. As will be discussed below, this change requiring compa-
nies to submit data on the safety and effectiveness of new drugs and 
vaccines in children occurred largely as an effect of public, political, 
and professional pressure for a more aggressive and, some argued, a 
more just approach to developing therapies for fatal childhood dis-
eases. 
7 
At the same time, however, questions are being raised about 
compliance with established guidelines and the effectiveness of pub-
lic oversight of human gene transfer research. Following in the wake 
of the tragic and troubling death of Jesse Gelsinger at the University 
of Pennsylvania in September 1999, emerging findings suggest lack of 
compliance with enrollment criteria, failure to report of adverse 
events, and a deeply problematic informed-consent process.8 
As a first step toward a broader examination of the role of child sub-
jects in human gene transfer research, this essay wiU examine the ten-
sive interface between federal and professional guidelines governing 
research with child subjects and research practice. Guidelines and 
oversight mechanisms exist; how are they interpreted, operationalized, 
and implemented? These questions will be examined by displaying 
one particular human gene transfer protocol - one that proposed to 
enroll HIV-positive children as subjects-as it negotiated the process 
of oversight and approval. Focusing on a particular protocol provides 
an opportunity for concrete display of the scientific, clinical, and polit-
ical dimensions of human gene transfer research involving children. 
At the same time, it highlights both ambiguities in the guidelines 
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themselves as well as the tendency of research practice to challenge 
straightforward criteria. In order to provide a framework wi~ which to 
examine the protocol, I begin with a brief history and overview of cur-
rent regulations and policies governing research with children as 
human subjects. 
CHILDREN AS RESEARCH SUBJECTS: 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND POLICY 
Two competing and legitimate tensions govern the question of 
whether and how to conduct research with children. On the one 
hand the historical witness of the abuse of vulnerable human subjects ' 
withi~ the U.S. medical system, especially in conjunction with gov-
ernment involvement, has justifiably led to a protectionist stance 
toward research involving children.9 Conservative, cautious safe-
guards are necessary to protect children, who cannot consent a~d who 
may experience the burdens of medical intervention as more fnghten-
ing and excruciating than adults, from being unduly exploited by the 
interests of researchers, the desperation of their parents, and the 
relentless momentum of the research imperative. As the recent FDA 
ruling suggests, however, the legitimate need to safeguard pa~icular 
children must be balanced with the interests of justice, particularly 
the need to advance the medical care of children. These tensions 
inform current federal and professional regulations and policy con-
cerning research involving children. 10 . 
The history of the federal regulations governing research on chil-
dren reflects the concern to protect child subjects. Public concern 
over the cases mentioned above led in part to the congressional insti-
tution, in 1974, of the National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. In the same 
year, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DH~W; 
now known as the Department of Health and Human Services, 
DHHS) issued its first regulations for the protection of human sub-
jects in research.11 The first DHEW/DHHS regulations covering 
research involving children appeared in 1978.12 Following the coun-
sel of the 1977 report Research Involving Children published by the 
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in , 
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Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 13 the DHHS published its final 
regulations, providing "additional protections for children involved as 
subjects in research" on March 8, 1983. These regulations became 
effective on June 5, 1983, codified as 45 CFR 46, Subpart D.14 
The precepts of Subpart D have guided research on children for 
the past sixteen years. These precepts distinguish five categories of 
research to clarify when children may be enrolled as research sub-
jects. These categories are:15 
S46.401 [Exempt research]. 
S46.404 Research not involving greater than minimal risk. 
S46.405 Research involving greater than minimal risk, but presenting 
the prospect of direct benefit to the individual subjects. 
S46.406 Research involving greater than minimal risk and no 
prospect of direct benefit to individual subjects, but likely to 
yield generalizable knowledge about the subject's disorder or 
condition. 
S46.407 Research not otherwise approvable, which presents an 
opportunity to understand, prevent, or alleviate a serious 
problem affecting the health or welfare of children. 
As is evident from even a brief scan of these categories, the anchor-
ing concept of the regulations is the concept of risk, articulated oper-
ationally as "minimal risk." Only once the level of risk is established 
may deliberations regarding the acceptability of enrolling children 
move to assessing the prospect of benefit; correlatively, should risk be 
minimal or less, the notion of benefit to individual child subjects 
becomes irrelevant. As Janofsky and Starfield note: "only if the IRB 
determines that a proposed project will in fact entail greater than min-
imal risk must its members additionally address other issues, such as 
whether there is prospect of direct benefit to individual subjects. . . . 
Thus, decisions about risk must be made separately from and before 
any consideration of possible benefit is judged."16 
"Minimal risk" is defined earlier in the federal regulations as follows: 
"'Minimal risk' means that the risks anticipated in the proposed 
research are not greater, considering probability and magnitude, than 
those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of 
routine physical or psychological examinations or tests. (S46.102G)"17 
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The definition for "greater than minimal risk" emerges fro · 
§46.406. Research that entails "greater than minimal risk" may be pe ' 
mitted in certain situations, but limits are still set: 'The interventi 
or procedure presents experiences to subjects that are reasonably co '.' 
mensurate with those inherent in their actual or expected medical! 
dental, psychological, social or educational situations." 
As will be argued below, human gene transfer protocols propose 
to date fall clearly entail "greater than minimal risk" and so must 
considered under S S46.405, 46.406, or 46.407. 
But as anyone who has sat on an institutional review board (IRB}~ 
knows well, determining how to categorize a specific protocol is mor~ · 
an art than a science. For it is in the concrete negotiations of IRB;' 
approval that the concern for protectionism competes with the legiti-
mate need to conduct research on children. Even before Subpart D 1 
was issued, pediatricians argued that restricting research with children 
would compromise pediatric medical care. As early as 1968, H. C. ; 
Shirkey coined the term "therapeutic orphan," arguing that a reluc- ' 
tance to. tes~ t~e safety and efficacy of drugs on children could danger- .· 
ously mh1b1t the development of needed pharmaceutical ; 
interventions for children, handicapping pediatric medicine.18 . 
Shirkey's concerns were not unfounded. As the Committee on 
Drugs of the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) recently reported: 
A survey of the 1973 Physician's Desk Reference revealed that prescrib-
ing information for 78% of medications included a disclaimer or lack 
of dose information for use by children. A subsequent survey of the 
1 ~91 Physician's Desk Reference showed that 81 % of listed drugs con-
tained language disclaiming use in children or restricting use to certain 
age groups. A survey of new molecular entities approved by the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) from 1984 through 1989 revealed that 
80% were approved without labeling for children. In 1992, 19 new 
molecular entities with potential use in children were approved by the 
FDA; 79% of these drugs were not labeled for use in children. In most 
instances drugs are not labeled for use in children because sufficient 
studies have not been conducted in children. 19 
Adult studies, however, are not sufficient. As Grodin and Alpert note: 
"children are not little adults."20 The AAP concurs: 
Growth, differentiation, and maturation can alter the kinetics end 
organ responses, and toxicities of drugs in the newborn infant ~hild 
' ' ' 
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or adolescent compared to the adult. Drug studies in adult humans 
may not adequately predict the pharmacokinetic, pharmacodynamic, 
or toxic properties of drugs in children. When drugs have been admin-
istered to children without sufficient pharmacology studies to identify 
the optimal therapeutic approach, children have occasionally suffered 
severe toxic effects, including death. These toxic effects could have 
been avoided with some of the drugs if appropriate dru~ studies had 
been undertaken before their widespread use in children. 1 
Given these significant physiological issues, coupled with the crisis in 
the pharmacological armamentarium, the MP calls for children to be 
included "in clinical studies of a drug when the drug offers potential 
benefits to them."22 
The recommendation of the AAP recently became public policy. 
Public pressure, channeled through the lobbying power of Congress 
and the Clinton White House, led to the recent issue of the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) Policy and Guidelines on the Inclusion of 
Children as Participants in Research Involving Human Subjects. 
Effective October 1, 1998, the purpose of the policy is explicit: "to 
increase the participation of children in research so that adequate data 
will be developed to support the treatment modalities for disorders 
and conditions that affect adults and may also affect children."23 The 
policy holds as follows: 
It is the policy of the NIH that children (i.e., individuals under the age 
of 21) must be included in all human subjects research, conducted by 
the NIH, unless there are scientific and ethical reasons not to include 
them ... proposals for research involving human subjects must include 
a description of plans for including children. If children will be exclud-
ed from the research, the application or proposal must present an accept-
able justification for the exclusion. . . . The inclusion of children as 
subjects in research must be in compliance with all applicable subparts 
of 45 CFR 46 as well as with other pertinent federal laws and regulations. 
Following the lead of the NIH, on November 27, 1998, the FDA 
issued new rules (effective April 1, 1999) requiring pharmaceutical 
companies seeking FDA approval for new drugs and vaccines to sub-
mit data on the safety and effectiveness of these modalities in children 
"if the product is likely to be used in a substantial number of pediatric 
patients" or if it provides a "meaningful therapeutic benefit" over exist-
ing treatments for children of similar ages.24 The FDA guidelines, as 
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might be expected, met with strenuous objections from drug compa- ' 
nies, who deemed them "impractical and burdensome," costly, and, 
surprisingly, "unethical, because they might put children at risk." 
In the near term, then, it seems that the balance between protec-
tionism and expansionism is shifting toward those who advocate 
increased involvement of children in biomedical research. Yet even 
those who recognize the need for research with children recognize 
that requirements for the inclusion of children might place children 
at an unacceptable risk. In light of this, a consensus has emerged 
among federal, professional, and academic commentators alike con-
firming a long-standing precept in research with child subjects: the 
necessary priority of research on adults. A survey of statements reveals 
this consensus. 
The 1998 NIH policy outlines a series of seven "justifications for 
exclusions" by which researchers might legitimately avoid the require· , 
ment to conduct studies on children. Of these, the fifth is most perti~ 
nent to our discussion. 
5. Insufficient data are available in adults to judge potential risk in 
children (in which case one of the research objectives could be to 
obtain sufficient adult data to make this judgment). While children 
usually should not be the initial group to be involved in research 
studies, in some instances, the nature and seriousness of the illness 
may warrant their participation earlier based on careful risk and ben-
efit analysis. 
This caveat first appears in the National Commission's report, where 
Recommendation 2B states: 
Where appropriate, studies have been conducted first on animals and 
adult humans, then on older children, prior to involving infants .... 
Whenever possible, research involving risk should be conducted first 
on animals and adult humans in order to ascertain the degree of risk 
and the likelihood of generating useful knowledge. Sometimes this is 
not relevant or possible, as when the research is designed to study dis-
orders or functions that have no parallel in animals or adults. In such 
cases, studies involving risk should be initiated on older children to the 
extent feasible prior to including infants, because older children are 
less vulnerable and they are better able to understand and to assent to 
participation. In addition, they are more able to communicate about 
any physical or psychological effects of such participation.25 
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As Robert Levine notes in his commentary on the report, 
"Investigators who proposed to do research on children without hav-
ing first done such research on animals and/or adults will be obligat-
ed to persuade the IRB that this is necessary. Suitable justification 
might be that the disorder or function to be studied has no parallel in 
animals or adults."26 
Although this recommendation was not included specifically as a 
regulation in Subpart D, the DHHS states in the Preamble to the 
1983 regulations that it expects this recommendation to be followed. 27 
In their 1994 work Children as Research Subjects, Michael A. Grodin 
and Leonard H. Glantz propose a set of "Points to Consider in 
Proposing or Reviewing Research Involving Children." The first of 
these points asks the following questions: 
I. Is the use of children as research subjects justified in this instance? 
(b) if the research question can be addressed first in adults, has 
research with adults been conducted? 
(c) has the adult research produced results that would indicate that 
the proposed research would benefit, or not be harmful to, the 
children?28 
Finally, the AAP concurs: "In most cases, studies in children should 
be preceded by initial clinical trials in adults to provide preliminary 
pharmacokinetic, safety, and efficacy data. In some instances, drugs 
intended to treat specific diseases that primarily or exclusively occur 
in children may be studied initially in children."29 
This prioritization is reflected in the commentary on the regula-
tions found in the IRB Guidebook published by the NIH's Office for 
Protection from Research Risks (OPRR): 
Phase I Trials. The issue of Phase I drug studies deserves special con-
sideration. The usual approach to designing drug studies involving 
children as subjects is for appropriate studies to be conducted first in 
animals, adults, and older children before young children are 
involved as research subjects. There are some studies, however, in 
which data may not be entirely generalizable from older populations, 
and in which the existence of life-threatening conditions for children 
are important considerations in the IRB's risk/benefit analysis. The 
requirement for previous testing in adults or older children may thus 
not be appropriate. Furthermore, some diseases specific to children 
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may require that children be involved without data from older groups 
(e.g., there is no adult model that mimics the state of HIV-infected 
newborns; Wilms' tumor and various cancers such as neuroblastoma 
affect infants who do not survive into older childhood). In some cases 
"tandem" studies in older populations and children may be justifi-
able. For example, some Phase 1 studies in children might be based 
on only pharmacologic safety and toxicity data (completed Phase 1 
and ongoing Phase 2) but without complete effectiveness data from 
trials in adults and older children. If the IRB approves a Phase 1 drug 
trial, the consent document must specify what is known about the 
probability that, and the degree to which, an intervention will be of 
possible benefit based on all of these data. 30 
Note here the meaning of "tandem studies" as used by the OPRR: 
researchers are to initiate Phase I trials in children when Phase I trials 
have been concluded in adults and adult research has moved to Phase • 
II trials. As we wilJ see, this is an important caveat vis-a-vis human : 
gene transfer research, given that almost all human gene transfer clin-
ical trials to date have been Phase I trials. 
CHILDREN AND HUMAN GENE TRANSFER 
RESEARCH: THE HIV PROTOCOL 
f 
While these guidelines may seem relatively straightforward and seem{' 
to provide a well-crafted, prudent, and thoughtful balance betweel1; 
protectionism and the legitimate need to enroll children in clinical'; 
trials, in practice their application is much more contested. Key:: 
terms and criteria of the guidelines are ambiguous to the point 
admitting what seems like almost any interpretation. What counts . 
"minimal risk" or, if that can be established, a "minor incremen~ 
over minimal risk? What constitutes a "prospect" of benefit? Is thi · 
different from a "possibility," a "hope," an "intention"? How impo 4 
tant must knowledge be to be "vital"? While common sense migh· 
provide relatively straightforward answers to these questions in th .. 
context of a particular protocol, clinical experience may often le 
investigators to assess notions such as "risk," "prospect," and urgen 
differently. In cases where the guidelines are so clear as to raise qu 
tions about a particular research endeavor on ethical grounds, revi · 
ers and committees often find themselves assailed with charges · 
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ignora~ce. or o~s~uctioni.sm, or worse, the ultimate argument stop-
per, with 1mpenlmg the lives of dying children. 
Clearly, these issues are not unique to human gene transfer 
~esearch. The concrete display of the applicability of these guidelines 
m the context of a human gene transfer protocol, however, simultane-
ously illumines issues surrounding the guidelines and issues surround-
in? the conduc~ of human gene transfer research. For the purposes of 
this essay, I will focus on a protocol for a Phase I trial entitled: 
"Transduction of CD 34( +) Cells from the Bone Marrow of HIV-I 
Infected Children: Comparative Marking by an RRE Decoy Gene 
an? a .Neutral Gene."31 An analysis of the protocol in light of the 
gm~elmes as we.ll a~ a partial narrative of its progress through the 
review process will highlights the issues identified above. 
I was first asked to review this protocol as part of the consolidated 
review process by the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee of the 
National Institutes of Health (RAC) in November 1995.32 My charge 
was to determine whether or not the protocol could be approved 
thr~ugh con~olidated revie~ or whether it warranted review by the 
entire committee at one of its quarterly meetings. 33 
.. In th~s protocol, the investigator proposed to enroll five HIV-l-pos-
1tive children between the ages of three and eighteen. 34 Through the 
protocol, the researchers sought to "determine whether the trans-
duced CD34+ cells engrafted and produced peripheral blood leuko-
cytes [T cells and their progenitors] that would have a selective 
survival advantage." The researchers hypothesized that the transduced 
gene would make the T cells resistant to HIV infection; they would 
then produce offspring T cells that would be likewise resistant to 
infection. Such resistance might, in theory, slow progression of the dis-
ease course. 
The protocol proposed to subject the child subjects to the follow-
ing clinical procedures: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
inclusion assessments, including phlebotomy, electroencephalo-
gram, electrocardiogram, and chest X ray; 
bone marrow aspirate to obtain cells for stromal growth; 
preoperative screening assay; 
bone marrow harvest under general anesthesia ( 10-15 cc/kg); 
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cell transduction: CD34+ T lymphocytes were to be isolated and 
transduced with two different retroviral vectors, one an anti-HIV-1 
gene (L-RRE-neo) and the other a neutral marking gene (LN); 
infusion of transduced cells; 
overnight hospitalization; 
post-"treatment" assays, including phlebotomy (approximately ten 
over a two-year period); and 
a possible additional one or two bone marrow aspirates . 
In my (albeit brief) history with the RAC at this point, it seemed clear 
that this protocol raised certain flags that might ordinarily have trig- , 
gered the full review process: 
It was the first anti-HIV protocol presented to the RAC that proposed 
to use children as research subjects. Generally, new diseases or new , 
study populations would automatically trigger full RAC review. Four 
protocols following a similar strategy of intracellular replication inhi-. 
bition for CD4+ or CD34+ cells had been approved for Phase I din .. 
ical trials in adults (9309-057, 9503-103, 9508-117, and 9511-134); 
three had just been approved in 1995 (March, August, and November , 
respectively). None had yet issued data. None was referenced in the 
protocol. Hence, while the RAC had reviewed HIV protocols, it had 
not reviewed an HIV protocol involving children. 
None had used this particular retroviral vector construct. Generally, 
new vectors would trigger full RAC review. A similar RRE decoy vec-
tor had been proposed in the adult protocol approved in November 
(9511-134). Other protocols had used J) similar strategy of intracellular, 
replication inhibition of CD34+ or CD4+ lymphocytes of HIV-positive 
patients. But the vector proposed here was a new construct. 
No animal studies were referenced. This would not have been an 
unusual situation in and of itself. Many human gene transfer protocols 
at this point cited the lack of availability of good animal models. 
Human HIV is notorious for lack of a good animal model. However, 
this issue was not addressed in the protocol. 
The first of these two flags would have served as a sufficient trigger' 
for many protocols reviewed by the full committee. However, reading 
the protocol against the background of the federal guidelines for 
research on children raised a host of other issues that seemed worthy 
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of fuller discussion. While a complete review of the protocol is beyond 
the constraints of this essay, three areas are worthy of highlight: the 
degree of risk presented to child subjects by the protocol; the 
"prospect" of benefit to the child subjects; and ~e lack of adult d~ta. 
As discussed above, the key concept anchormg the federal gmde-
lines is the nature and degree of risk presented to the child subjects by 
the protocol. Risk ass~ssment for child subj~cts ?,1ust take,,into acc~unt 
not only risks of physical harm but nonphysical burdens the sub1ects 
will bear as well. In the case of children, these "burdens" take on 
greater weight, as children cannot truly consent _to bea~ them. Hence, 
the determination of risks and burdens for this particular protocol 
would be required to address at least the following: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
the spectrum of preinclusion, preoperative, and follow-up screen-
ing procedures; 
the risks associated with sedation and general anesthesia in chil-
dren and specifically in HIV-positive children; 
the risks associated with the bone marrow harvest procedure - risks 
of hemorrhage or infection during or after the procedure; risks of 
osteomyelitis; the possibility that small children might require 
postharvest blood transfusions to replace blood and marrow lost 
during the harvest; 
the burden of additional hospitalization and additional medical-
ization of the lives of these children, including at least two 
overnight hospitalizations and at least ten follow-up visits; 
the risks and burdens of one bone marrow aspiration with the pos-
sibility of one to two additional aspirations; 
the risks associated with the reinfusion of the genetically modified 
cells, including (as stated in the consent form, Protocol p. 55) 
"fever, chills, difficult breathing, and rarely, a severe allergic reac-
tion that can lead to death"; 
the standard risks associated with human gene transfer, including 
unpredicted vector integration leading to cancer and germ-line 
issues. 
Given this list, one begins with the question: Does this protocol 
entail "greater than minimal risk"? For the risks to be categorized as 
"minimal," as noted above, "the risks anticipated in the proposed 
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research [must not be] not greater, considering probability and ma~ ·. 
nitude, than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during th" 
performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or ;, 
tests." Would the above present experiences that these particular chi} •. 
dren would likely encounter in daily life or in the course of routine., 
examinations? Clearly not. Hence a relatively easy assessment is made '\ 
that this protocol presents "greater than minimal risk." If so, it must be . 
considered under S S45 CFR 405, 406, or 407. . 
S45 CFR 405, as noted above, raises the question of "prospect" of~ 
benefit. If the risks presented by the protocol are deemed "greater than 
minimal," research is approvable if it can be demonstrated that there is 
a "prospect of direct benefit to the individual subjects." As the guidelines 
note: "The risk is justified by the anticipated benefit to the subjects; and 
the relation of the anticipated benefit to the risk is at least as favorable 
to the subjects as that presented by available alternative approaches." 
Therefore, to justify the more than minimal risk and burden, the 
investigators in this case must be able to demonstrate that there is a 
reasonable "prospect of direct benefit" to the child subjects to be 
enrolled, that benefits are anticipated. 
What sort of case did the investigators present? When turning to the 
text of the protocol itself, one finds some rather clear clues: 
Although we do not think that this initial study is likely to have a signif-
icant medical benefit for the patient, we believe that it is safe and may 
provide useful information for progressing to potential beneficial treat-
ments for AIDS. (Emphasis mine; Protocol, nontechnical abstract; sim-
ilar statement included in the scientific abstract.) 
While this relatively low-risk protocol is not likely to have significant 
clinical benefit, it may provide useful information on the feasibility and 
potential efficacy of this approach. Positive results in this study may 
allow consideration of future studies entailing higher risks but higher 
potential benefits. (Emphasis mine; Protocol, p. 30.) 
Although patients will have routine monitoring of the disease status 
performed as part of their standard clinical care, it is not a primary end-
point of the study. (Protocol, p. 25.) 
The protocol is relatively clear that no benefit is anticipated to accrue 
to the child subjects. Moreover, the protocol was submitted as a Phase 
I clinical trial, which by definition is not designed to offer benefit. 
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The audience, however, makes a difference in how the case is pre-
sented. When the investigators turn to address the RAC directly, the 
above disavowals of anticipation and prospect of clinical benefit are 
offset with a disclaimer about theoretical possibilities: 
While the possibility of benefit from the protocol is unknown, the 
potential benefits could be significant. Slowing or preventing 
immunologic deterioration could be life-extending or even life-sav-
ing. (Emphasis mine; Response to NIH "Points to Consider," M-11-A-
l, p. 23.) 
In this Phase I study, it is not known whether the subjects will receive 
any benefits. The major goal of the study is to determine if this gene 
therapy approach is safe and feasible in patients with HIV infection. It 
is possible that the presence of the RRE decoy gene in some blood cells 
will allow them to avoid active infection by HIV. This could help main-
tain immune function and lessen the risk of infection .... While we 
have attempted to not overstate this possibility, it certainly is hoped by 
the investigators that this would be the result. (Emphasis mine; 
Response to NIH "Points to Consider," M-11-3, p. 26.) 
Here, theory takes the place of evidence; hope has replaced warrant-
ed anticipation. 
A similar shift in rhetoric appears in the Informed Consent form. 
Here the emphasis on the positive possibilities becomes even more 
pronounced. The first sentences of the consent form state: 
You/your child [are]/is infected with human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV) and are/is eligible to participate in a medical study of gene 
therapy as a possible treatment. A possible form of treatment for HIV 
is gene therapy, where a new gene is put into a patient's cells .... If 
the RRE decoy can bind the HIV protein, it might prevent the virus 
from growing in the body. (Emphasis mine; Protocol, Informed 
Consent Form, p. 49.) 
It is not known whether gene therapy for HIV will be effective. It may 
be difficult to get the gene into patient's bone marrow stem cells, the 
gene may not be turned-on in the cells in the body, or the gene may 
not actually protect the cells. The purpose of this study is to test 
whether gene therapy with the RRE decoy gene can be performed safe-
ly, whether it can get the RRE decoy gene into the cells and whether 
the RRE decoy gene will inhibit HIV infection of cells. (Emphasis 
mine; Protocol, Informed Consent Form, p. 50.) 
230 GE\'l!ETICS AND ETHICS 
The "P?te.nt~al Benefits" section of the consent form includes this 
less ophm1shc assessment, but alters it significantly with the closing~ 
qualification: ,); 
We do not know if there will be any direct benefits to you/your child from 
participating in the study. The major goal of the study is to determine if 
this gene therapy approach is safe and feasible in patients with HN infec-
tion .... If the RRE decoy gene were present in sufficient numbers of 
cells, this could help maintain immune function and lessen the risk of 
infection. (Emphasis mine; Protocol, Informed Consent Form, p. 51.) 
( 
The therapeutic possibilities dangle before the eyes of parents with :; 
HIV-stricken children. What parent would not provide their child ~ 
with this chance? 
The institutional IRB noted the ambiguity in this language and that , 
the data did not support the claim to prospect, probability, or likeli- ; 
hood of benefit. For this reason, upon its initial review, the IRB provid-
ed a lengthy critique of the protocol and deferred it.35 
The investigators made two responses to this critique. First, they 
pointed to the more positive statements above and argued that "there 
is possibility of direct benefit to the subjects, if the hypotheses being ' 
tested are found to be correct" (emphasis mine; Protocol 
Investigator's Response to IRB, p. 15). The members of the IRB noted 
t~~t there were a nu?1ber of "ifs" that would have to occur for possi-
bility to accrue. The investigator notes that he and his colleagues "cer- , 
tainly hope" that this would be the result. However, as Kathryn ' 
Whartenby of the FDA noted in her recommendation that this proto-
col receive full RAC review, there is little proof to substantiate this ! 
statement or this hope. 36 In fact, some of the data presented in the 
protocol seems to argue against clinical benefit. 37 
Secondly, the investigator argued that in the nontechnical 
abstract, he "thought it best to be pessimistic to not recruit patients 
with false claims" (Response from Investigator, p. 6).38 This state-
ment seems difficult to reconcile with the qualified-but-optimistic 
rhetoric in the informed consent form. In other words, when address-
i?g .th.e scientifi~ c.ommunity, the investigator seems to be more pes-
s1m1shc and realistic, acknowledging that the potential benefits of this 
research will accrue not to the child subjects themselves but to 
progress in the battle against AIDS. When addressing reviewers and 
prospective parents, however, realism gives way to hope. 
GENE "THERAP¥'' 231 
However, even though the "prospect" and "possibility" of direct 
benefit to enrolled child subjects may have been remote in this case, 
the research might still have been approvable under S46.406, which 
allows for "research involving greater than minimal risk and no 
prospect of direct benefit to individual subjects, but likely to yield gen-
eralizable knowledge about the subject's disorder or condition." Again, 
a number of conditions obtain: 
The risk represents a minor increase over minimal risk; 
The intervention or procedure presents experiences to subjects that are 
reasonably commensurate with those inherent in their actual or 
expected medical, dental, psychological, social, or educational sit-
uations; and 
The intervention or procedure is likely to yield generalizable knowl-
edge about the subjects' disorder or condition, which is of vital 
importance for the understanding or amelioration of the subjects' 
disorder or condition. (Emphasis mine; S46.406.) 
Here again, the open-ended nature of the terms used in the guidelines 
leaves room for debate and disagreement. The easiest of these criteria 
would be the second. It seems relatively clear that the procedures pro-
posed in the protocol, namely, bone marrow aspirates and bone marrow 
harvest under general anesthesia, would not normally be encountered 
by HIV-positive children in the course of treatment for their disease. 
Thus the procedures would not be "reasonably commensurate." 
Would the protocol, however, present only a "minor" increase over 
minimal risk? Here the guidelines become the most ambiguous and have 
generated the most debate. The investigators argued, for example, that the 
procedures did indeed represent only "a minor increase over minimal 
risk" (Response of Investigators to RAC Review, p. 3) and that "the risks 
and discomforts are relatively minor" (Response oflnvestigators, p. 12). In 
response to critiques, the investigator stated that since the bone marrow 
aspirations are performed under conscious sedation, they are "not signifi-
cantly more painful than having a phlebotomy;' and that children under-
going bone marrow harvests under general anesthesia "have minimal pain 
post-operatively" (Response of Investigators, p. 3). 
As Janofsky and Starfield have noted, clinical experience certainly 
shapes one's assessment of the magnitude and possibility of clinical 
risk. 39 These investigators had performed many bone marrow procedures 
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on children and experienced no adverse events; hence their assessment 
of the procedures would differ radically from, say, a layperson like myself 
reading about the procedures.40 · 
The third and final criterion of S46.406 is that research entailing 
greater-than-minimal risk without prospect of benefit to the child sub.. 
ject should provide generalizable knowledge of vital importance for 
the understanding or amelioration of the subject's condition or disor-
der. But given the improbability of benefit, it was not clear to me how 
the scientific and molecular findings from this trial would be of "vital" 
importance to the amelioration of pediatric HIV. How ought this be 
assessed? According to what criteria? Or is it the case that any findings 
relative to a terrible disease with certain mortality in children count as 
"vital," that is, that it is the nature of the disease rather than the nature 
of the scientific findings that characterizes knowledge as vital? 
Clearly, the nature and seriousness of pediatric HIV requires that 
research be conducted, research that will at some point require enroll-
ment of child subjects, perhaps earlier in the research process than 
might be otherwise encouraged. However, as the NIH documents on 
inclusion of children note, "their participation earlier [must be] based 
on careful risk and benefit analysis." 
While physiological differences between children and adults 
reduce the usefulness of adult models for understanding pediatric 
HIV, it was not clear that there were no points of contact. Would none 
of the data from the Phase I adult HIV human gene transfer trials be 
generalizable to pediatric populations? Or might some of the findings 
provide at least a modicum of insight? In other words, it seemed that 
certain research questions might be addressable in adults or other pop-
ulations. 41 The trials approved by the RAC, however, had not yet had 
time to be initiated nor had they produced any published findings. 
This situation seemed to meet well the recent NIH exclusion criteri-
on: "Insufficient data are available in adults to judge potential risk in 
children (in which case one of the research objectives could be to 
obtain sufficient adult data to make this judgment)." 
These seemed to be the key questions, and questions on which I 
wished to have more counsel. However, since the conjunction joining 
the three criteria given for S46.406 is an "and," it seemed questionable 
to me that this protocol could be justified under this category.42 
If S46.406 remained an open question, §46.407 remained an 
option. Here the guidelines provide a mechanism for "Research not 
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otherwise approvable, which presents an opportunity to understand, 
prevent, or alleviate a serious problem affecting the health or welfare of 
children." Such research might be approved by "the Secretary [for 
Health and Human Services], after consultation with a panel of experts 
in pertinent disciplines (for example: science, medicine, education, 
ethics, law), and following opportunity for public review and com-
ment." RAC review would be the ideal vehicle for such consultation. 
This, then, was the modest conclusion that I reached in my review: 
since the arguments for justification under S46.405 and S46.406 
remained debatable, the protocol seemed a good candidate for the 
standard process of full RAC review. Extended consideration by a 
panel of persons with diverse expertise would help to settle the scien-
tific and ethical questions. I consequently recommended, on 
December 4, that the protocol ought not be exempted from full RAC 
review. As the RAC was meeting on December 4 and 5, 1995, the pro-
tocol would be considered at the RAC's next meeting, in March 1996. 
This recommendation, however, was declined, an artifact equally 
of challenge to the guidelines and of political circumstances.43 The 
March 1996 meeting of the RAC was canceled ostensibly because of 
"lack of protocols to review"; clearly, by early February, the decision 
had been made to approve the protocol. In early spring, the then-
director of the Office of Recombinant DNA Activity (ORDA) 
announced that he was retiring from the NIH to accept a position with 
the Institute for Human Gene Therapy at the University of 
Pennsylvania. The June meeting of the RAC was likewise canceled. In 
May, Harold Varmus, then-director of the NIH itself, unilaterally dis-
banded the RAC, an action that met with controversy-approbation 
from some and outrage from others. In light of public response, the 
RAC was later reconstituted, but in a significantly reconfigured form. 
When it met again in December 1996, its authority to recommend 
approval or disapproval of protocols had been stripped. 
HUMAN GENE TRANSFER RESEARCH AND 
CHILD SUBJECTS: A CRITICAL JUNCTURE 
The preceding analysis and narrative is not presented to suggest that the 
circumstances surrounding this particular protocol have been typical of 
234 GENETICS AND ETHICS 
RAC approval of human gene transfer trials involving childre 
Nonetheless, the history of this protocol, when read in light oft 
guidelines governing human subjects research with children, raises' • 
number of questions for both research with children in general andi 
the field of human gene transfer research specifically. .i.; 
With regard to the federal guidelines and professional policies, thiai 
particular protocol provides additional evidence for the increasingly,-i 
perceived disjunction between well-crafted research guidelines and ' 
their actual implementation in the clinical research setting. Part of I; 
this disjunction stems, no doubt, from the fluidity of terms and critew· ; 
ria contained in the guidelines. Certainly, given the open-ended and ·· 
creative nature of clinical research, guidelines governing research 
with human subjects ought to admit of some openness to interpreta .. · 
tion. But the regression of interpretability ought not be infinite. 
As the U.S. research industry moves toward increased enrollment of 
children in clinical trials, we must seriously consider how useful the fed. · 
eral guidelines will prove in ensuring that the interests of individual sub- ·. 
jects are not sacrificed for the good of future children. This is especially 1 
urgent for children enrolled in Phase I protocols or children enrolled as 
controls, where only risks await them. It clearly falls within the purview 
of the oversight and ethics community to create clarity and consensus as 
far as possible. The National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) 
or OPRR need to provide guidance to IRBs-which are sometimes 
plagued with inexperience and at other times faced with institutional ' 
pressure-with regard to the interpretation and implementation of key 
terms and criteria. Research ought to be conducted in the near term to 
elaborate acceptable boundaries for interpreting phrases such as 
"greater than minimal risk," "minor increment," "prospect of benefit," 
and "vital knowledge." These agencies ought to provide criteria for dis-
tinguishing between a benefit that is "anticipated" or "likely" and one 
that is simply "possible," "hoped for," or "intended." 
Such clarification would also serve to address a problem endemic 
to the practice of clinical research in general, but especially troubling 
with regard to research with children-the deeply problematic confla-
tion of "research" and "treatment."44 Phase I trials, contrary to the lan-
guage used in the informed consent document of the HIV protocol 
above, ought not be classified as "treatment." These endeavors are 
strictly scientific experiments, designed to test scientific end points 
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and to assess the toxicity of the compounds being administered. The 
situation is clearly different with Phase II and Phase III clinical trials, 
the kind specifically called for by the recent NIH and FDA rulings. 
Here, the regulatory agencies require pharmaceutical companies t? 
provide dosing and safety information for moieties already proven effi-
cacious in adults. In these instances, the word "treatment" might more 
reasonably be used in conjunction with the word "experiment." In 
both cases, however, the OPRR ought to provide guidance to investi-
gators and IRBs on the appropriate language to use in the informed 
consent process (both the written and the face-to-face components) as 
well as how to warrant "prospect" of benefit in the case of radically 
new interventions. The new push to increase child enrollment in clin-
ical trials, the political pressure exerted by parents on regulatory bod-
ies to allow dying children the "right" to be enrolled, and the 
increased financial power of the biotechnology industry converge to 
make these issues urgent; unless they are addressed in the near terms, 
current guidelines may prove to be little more than formalities sacri-
ficed to expediency or desperation. 
These issues remain especially urgent for the field of human gene 
transfer research. The review of the HIV protocol, however, points to 
an additional set of questions specific to the field. The HIV protocol 
and the events surrounding the existence and purview of the RAC 
from 1996 forward provided preludes to the sobering findings that 
emerged from the Gelsinger case: 
• a cavalier and obstructionist attitude on the part of industry and 
many researchers toward ethical guidelines and broader oversight 
of research practice;45 
• the fact that human gene transfer remains a fledgling field in 
_which much basic research remains to be done;46 
• the fact that the risks of known methods of human gene transfer 
have perhaps been underreported or downplayed;47 
• the fact that risks of effective methods of human gene transfer 
remain largely unknown; 
• the fact that human gene transfer's therapeutic promise remains 
sadly unfulfilled ten years after initiation of the first protocol. 
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Much more basic research needs to be done in order to understan( 1 
the diverse molecular mechanisms governing the array of disord~;' 
potentially amenable to gene transfer technologies. Ironically, it was just' 
at the juncture when this conclusion was first publicly stated that thd.< 
power of public oversight of human gene transfer research was di~c· 
abled.48 One of the main reasons given for disbanding the RAC in 1 <)%: 
was that it attended too much to issues of ethics; as Harold Varmus stat~. :. 
ed: "the RAC had begun to exhibit a taste for trivia: it often got bogg~ · 
down in debates over the wording of patient consent forms."49 Perhapgc •. 
it is the case, however, that issues of patient well-being and the protec• " 
tion of human subjects are not quite so trivial after all. 
Moreover, the HIV protocol points to a global question with regard 
to the field of human gene transfer as a whole. It was a Phase I prot°"' 
col. Almost all of the human gene transfer protocols initiated to date, 
whether with adult subjects or child subjects, have likewise been 
Phase I studies. The first human gene transfer protocol began May 22, 
1989. It was a "marking" protocol that accompanied an immunother-
apy study in adult patients with metastatic melanoma with a life 
expectancy estimated at up to 90 days. By definition, long-term risks 
would be impossible to assess in this population. On February 5, 1990, 
the investigators presented preliminary data from five of the first six 
patients treated to that point. The second protocol, the famous SCIO.. : 
ADA protocol, was approved by the RAC on July 31, 1990, and 
enrolled its first patient on September 14, 1990. 
This situation and the significant participation of children in the 
early days of human gene transfer return us to one of the few points of 
agreement noted earlier between those who hold a protectionist 
stance on the issue of research on children and those who advocate a 
more expansionist approach: Phase I trials in children ought to be ini-
tiated only after Phase I trials in adults have provided important indi-
cations on both safety and efficacy. Had sufficient research been 
conducted by 1990 or 1993 to assess the risks that might be presented 
to child subjects? Was there sufficient evidence in this phase to sub-
stantiate "prospect" of benefit from adult studies? 
These are larger questions than can be entertained here. Clearly 
severe combined immunodeficiency (SCIO), neuroblastoma, some of 
the leukemias studied, as well as the single-gene disorders, are serious 
childhood illnesses. They have no parallel in adults. But this alone does 
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· · 50 H not warrant their further subjection to expenmentat10n. uman gene 
transfer as a proposed therapeutic modality is, a~ t?e bulk ~f the ~roto­
cols and the general rhetoric surrounding genetic mterventton witness-
es an intervention with potential application to a broad range of 
di~eases that affiict adults as well as children. A number of the research 
questions faced by early researchers in human gene transfer could have 
been answered by adult studies. Hence human gene transfer seems a 
logical candidate for OPRR's proposal for "tandem" research: 
In some cases "tandem" studies in older populations and children may 
be justifiable. For example, some Phase l studies in children might be 
based on only pharmacologic safety and toxicity data \completed Phase 
l and ongoing Phase 2) but without complete effectiveness data from 
trials in adults and older children. If the IRB approves a Phase l drug 
trial the consent document must specify what is known about the prob-
abillty that and the degree to which, an intervention will be of possible 
' 51 benefit based on all of these data. 
This however was not the route chosen by the field of human gene 
transfe;. Hence ~e remain faced with an important question: How 
was it that this new, untried, and controversial research endeavor 
moved so quickly to the use of children as subj~cts? . . 
The preliminary answer, I will hazard at this pomt, ts as m~c~ a 
matter of the sociopolitical context of NIH-funded research as it is a 
matter of clinical science. Is it a coincidence that the Human 
Genome Project and the field of human gene transfer research, whose 
icon was a vulnerable child suffering from an incurable disease, were 
launched almost simultaneously? The elaboration of that answer must 
await another day. 
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NOTES 
1. As Larry Churchill, et al., argue in "Genetic Research as Therapy: 
Implications of 'Gene Therapy' for Informed Consent," Journal of Law, 
Medicine, 6 Ethics 26:1 (1998):38-47; the phrase gene "therapy" often serves 
rhetorically to mask the fact that human gene transfer interventions ought 
properly to be classified as research. See also my response, "Commentary: 
Reconstruing Genetic Research as Research," Journal of Law, Medicine, 6 
Ethics 26: 1 (1998):48-54. 
2. Michael Winerip, "Fighting for Jacob," New York Times Magazine 
(December 6, 1998), recounts the story of Richard and Jordana Sontag, who 
fought an emotionally excruciating political and PR battle to enroll Jacob, 
afflicted with Canavan disease, in a disputed clinical trial of human gene 
transfer. 
3. Denise Grady, "At Gene Therapy's Frontier, the Amish Build a 
Clinic," New York Times (June 29, 1999). Grady reports here on a planned 
clinical trial that would enroll three Amish children in a human gene trans-
fer protocol designed to address Crigler-Najjar syndrome, a deadly autosomal ' 
recessive disorder caused by the lack of a liver enzyme required for removing 
bilirubin from the blood. Affected children, of whom there is a disproportion-
ately high population within Pennsylvania Amish communities due to their 
habits of intermarriage, currently combat the syndrome with high-tech light 
therapy. The images are most striking. 
4. A retrospective study of human gene transfer protocols with child sub-
jects (see note 7) reveals that children were the intended subjects of 50 per-
cent of the protocols in 1990 and of 50 to 63 percent of approved protocols 
in 1991 (depending on the age limits used to define "child"). This percent-
age dropped in 1992 as the overall number of protocols approved began to 
climb, but overall, in 1992, the total percentage of protocols enrolling chil-
dren remained at 3 3 percent. This figure eventually leveled off and stabilized 
at around 20 percent. 
5. Only two articles to date come close to this issue. The first, by John C. 
Fletcher, "Ethical Issues in and beyond Prospective Clinical Trials of 
Human Gene Therapy," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10 
(1985):293-309, questions the wisdom of enrolling terminally ill children in 
the first trials because desperation may be used to justify unreasonable risk. 
This article was written, however, five years before the first trial commenced. 
The second piece seems that it would come close to this issue, given where 
it appears. This is Nancy Ondrusek, "Ethical Issues in Gene Therapy," in 
Ethics in Pediatric Research, ed. Gideon Koren (Malabar, Fl.: Krieger 
Publishing, 1993 ), 15 5-70. However, Ondrusek's essay is simply a standard 
GENE "THERAPY" 239 
overview of ethical issues in human gene transfer research; she gives little 
attention to the issue of children as subjects. 
6. Such a full examination is under way. Spurred by the events sur-
rounding the RAC in 1996, I embarked on a retrospective study of human 
gene transfer research involving children. This study is currently ongoing. At 
this point, we have obtained copies of the approximately thirty protocols 
involving children approved by the RAC from 1989 to 1996 (the point of its 
hiatus) and are in the process of conducting a qualitative review of tl1ese pro-
tocols in light of the federal regulations governing research with children. 
7. Robert Pear, "F.D.A Will Require Companies to Test Drugs on 
Children," New York Times (November 28, 1998). The NIH issued a similar 
policy, effective October 1998; see NIH Policy and Guidelines on the Inclusion 
of Children as Participants in Research Involving Human Sub;ects, available 
from http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/not98-024.html. 
8. An eighteen-year-old subject in a clinical trial targeting ornithine tran-
scarbamylase deficiency, Jesse Gelsinger, being under twenty-one years of age, 
would have qualified as a "child subject" according to certain guidelines. For 
an account of the findings of tile initial inquiry at the December 8-9, 1999, 
meeting of the RAC, see Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "F.D.A. Officials Fault Penn 
Team in Gene Therapy Death," New York Times (December 9, 1999). 
9. The current list of classic cases includes tile Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 
the injection of live cancer cells into chronically ill patients, the hepatitis 
studies on mentally handicapped children at Willowbrook State Hospital in 
New York, Henry Beecher's expos~ of ethically suspect research published in 
respected, peer-reviewed, scientific journals, controversy around research 
involving live and aborted fetuses, and the U.S. radiation experiments. For an 
overview of these cases in the context of Nazi experimentation and the result-
ing Nuremberg and Helsinki Codes, see Gregory Pence, Classic Cases in 
Medical Ethics, 3rd ed. (San Francisco: Harper, 2000). 
10. As historians of human subjects research know well, the basic outlines 
of this tension were initially mapped in the debates between Paul Ramsey 
and Richard McCormick in the early 1970s. For more on this see, among 
others, Richard A. McCormick, "Proxy Consent in the Experimentation 
Situation," Perspectives in Biology 6 Medicine 18 ( 1974 ):2-20; Paul Ramsey, 
"Proxy Consent for Children," Hastings Center Report 7 (1977):4ff; Richard 
A. McCormick, "Experimentation in Children: Sharing in Sociality," 
Hastings Center Report 6 (1976):41-46; Paul Ramsey, "The Enforcement of 
Morals: Nontherapeutic Research on Children-A Reply to Richard 
McCormick," Hastings Center Report 6 (1976):21-30. 
11. Federal Register43:18 (1974), 914. 
12. Federal Register 30:31 (1978), 786. 
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13. National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of'c 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Report and Recommendations(,;; 
Research involving Children. (Washington, D.C.: DEHW Publication No. ( 
(OS) 77-0004, 1977). In 1979, the commission published the landmarl,. 
Belmont Report, outlining the ethical framework upon which its recommen< 
dations regarding human subjects was premised. See National Commission'.'\ 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral ', 
Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the. ·. 
Protection of Human Subjects of Research. DHEW Publication No. (OS),· 
78-0012, Appendix 1, DEHW Publication No. (OS) 78-0013, Appendix II. 
(Washington, D.C.: DHEW Publication No. (OS) 78-0014, 1978). 
14. 45 CFR 46, Subpart D (1983). . 
15. For those not familiar with the federal guidelines, a summary of the 
components relevant to the discussion in this essay is provided here. The 
complete text of S45 CFR 46 is available from http://www.med.umich.edu/ 
irbmed/Federa1Documents/hhs/HHS45CFR46.html. 
S46.401 Exempt research 
Certain research is exempt for all human subjects following specifi-
cations in S46.l 01. Exemptions include certain educational tests; the 
collection of existing data, documents, records, pathological speci-
mens, or diagnostic specimens; certain research and demonstration 
projects; and tests of taste, food quality, and consumer acceptance. 
S46.404 Research not involving greater than minimal risk 
HHS will conduct or fund research, in which the IRB finds that no 
greater than minimal risk to children is presented, only if the IRB finds 
that adequate provisions are made for soliciting the assent of the children 
and the permission of their parents or guardians, as set forth in S46.408. 
S46.405 Research involving greater than minimal risk, but presenting 
the prospect of direct benefit to the individual subjects 
HHS will conduct or fund research, in which the IRB finds that 
more than minimal risk to children is presented by an intervention or 
procedure that holds out the prospect of direct benefit for the individ-
ual subject, or by a monitoring procedure that is likely to contribute to 
the subject's well-being, only if the IRB finds that: 
The risk is justified by the anticipated benefit to the subjects; 
The relation of the anticipated benefit to the risk is at least as favor-
able to the subjects as that presented by available alternative 
approaches; and 
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Adequate provisions are made for soliciting the assent of the chil-
dren and permission of their parents or guardians, as set forth in 
S46.408. 
S46.406 Research involving greater than minimal risk and no prospect 
of direct benefit to individual subjects, but likely to yield generalizable 
knowledge about the subject's disorder or condition. 
HHS wil1 conduct or fund research, in which the IRB finds that 
more than minimal risk to children is presented by an intervention or 
procedure that does not hold out the prospect of direct benefit for the 
individual subject, or by a monitoring procedure which is not likely to 
contribute to the well-being of the subject, only if the IRB finds that: 
The risk represents a minor increase over minimal risk; 
The intervention or procedure presents experiences to -subjects 
that are reasonably commensurate with those inherent in their 
actual or expected medical, dental, psychological, social, or 
educational situations; 
The intervention or procedure is likely to yield generalizable knowl-
edge about the subjects' disorder or condition, which is of vital 
importance for the understanding or amelioration of the subjects' 
disorder or condition; and 
Adequate provisions are made for soliciting assent of the children and 
permission of their parents or guardians, as set forth in S46.408. 
S46.407 Research not otherwise approvable, which presents an oppor-
tunity to understand, prevent, or alleviate a serious problem affecting 
the health or welfare of children 
HHS will conduct or fund research that the IRB does not believe 
meets the requirements of S46.404, S46.405, or S46.406, only if: 
The IRB finds that the research presents a reasonable opportunity to 
further the understanding, prevention, or alleviation of a serious 
problem affecting the health or welfare of children, and 
The Secretary, after consultation with a panel of experts in pertinent 
disciplines (for example: science, medicine, education, ethics, 
law), and following opportunity for public review and comment, 
has determined either: 
That the research in fact satisfies the conditions of S46.404, S46.405, 
or S46.406, as applicable, or 
242 GENETICS AND ETHICS 
The following: (i) the research presents a reasonable opportunity to 
further the understanding, prevention, or alleviation of a serious 
problem affecting the health or welfare of children; (ii) the 
research will be conducted in accordance with sound ethical prin-
ciples; (iii) adequate provisions are made for soliciting the assent of 
children and the permission of their parents or guardians, as set 
forth in S46.408. 
16. Jeffrey Janofsky and Barbara Starfield, "Assessment of Risk 
Research on Children," Journal of Pediatrics 98 (1981):843. 
17. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "Final Regulatiom0 
Amending Basic HHS Policy for the Protection of Human Research'. 
Subjects," Federal Register46 (January 26, 1981): 8387. 
18. See H. C. Shirkey, "Therapeutic Orphans," Journal of Pediatrics 7l 
( 1968): 119-20; and Robert Levine, Ethics and the Regulation of Clinical; 
Research, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, Md.: Urban and Schwarzenberg, 1986),, 
240-41. The term "therapeutic orphan" has shifted from its initial meaning, > 
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if developed, would not meet a significant enough market to result in prof-
itability. Hence drug companies do not invest their resources in finding the 
cause or therapies for these diseases; many single-gene disorders qualify as 
"orphan diseases." See also Levine, Ethics and the Regulation of Clinical 
Research: "the prevailing practice in the United States is to ignore the . 
orphaning clauses on the package labels. Consequently, we have a tendency , 
to distribute unsystematically the unknown risks of drugs in children and 
pregnant women, thus maximizing the frequency of their occurrence and 
minimizing the probability of their detection. Parenthetically, it should be 
noted that most drugs proved safe and effective in adults do not produce 
unexpected adverse reactions in children; however, when they do, the num· 
bers of harmed children tend to be much higher than they would be if the 
drugs had been studied systematically before they were introduced into the 
practice of medicine." 
19. Committee on Drugs, American Academy of Pediatrics, "Guidelines 
for the Ethical Conduct of Studies to Evaluate Drugs in Pediatric ' 
Populations," Pediatrics 95 (1995):286. 
20. Michael A. Grodin and Joel J. Alpert, "Children as Participants in 
Medical Research," Pediatric Clinics of North America 3 5 ( 1988): 1391. 
21. American Academy of Pediatrics, 286. 
22. American Academy of Pediatrics, 287. 
23. NIH Policy and Guidelines on the Inclusion of Children as 
Participants in Research Involving Human Subjects. 
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24. Robert Pear, "F.D.A. Requires Companies to Test Drugs on 
Children," New York Times, November 28, 1998. Pear notes, "If, for example, 
new drug is urgently needed to treat a life-threatening disease in children 
:nd if there is no adequate therapy on the market, the Government may insist 
that the manufacturer immediately begin tests in children, before full data on 
adults are available." 
25. The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Research involving Children: Report 
and Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: DHEW, 1977), 2-3. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, this position was likewise echoed by the FDA and the 
American Academy of Pediatrics. See Paolo L. Morselli and Francois 
Regnier, "Ethics in Pediatric Research for New Antie~ileptic ~rugs," in 
Antiepileptic Drug Therapy in Pediatrics, ed. P. L. Morselh, C. E. Pippenger, 
and J. K. Penry (New York: Raven Press, 1983), 310. . 
26. Robert J. Levine, "Research involving Children: The National 
Commission's Report," Clinical Research 26 (1978):62. 
27. Department of Health and Human Services, "Additional Protections 
for Children Involved as Subjects in Research," Federal Register 48 
(1983):9814-20; at 9816. . 
28. Michael A. Grodin and Leonard H. Clantz, eds. Children as Research 
Subjects: Science, Ethics, and Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 215. 
29. American Academy of Pediatrics, 287. This recommendation is also 
found in the Canadian National Council on Bioethics in Human Research, 
"Revised Recommendations of the NCBHR Report on Research Involving 
Children," 4 (1993):11; and the American Medical Association, Current 
Opinions of the Council of Ethical and Judicial Affairs on Clinical Investigation 
(1992):5. Sujit Choudhry, in his "Review of Legal Instruments and Codes on 
Medical Experimentation with Children," Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare 
Ethics 3 (1994), draws as his first conclusion: "(l) There seems to be a general 
consensus that pediatric research is permissible but should only be conducted 
when research with adults cannot yield the same information," (570). The MP 
also notes: "[The investigator] must strive to obtain as much information as pos-
sible about the safety and efficacy of a drug before enrolling children as sub-
jects" (287). ''The investigator must be aware of possible conflicts between their 
own academic, professional, and financial interests; the 'need to know'; and the 
interests of the child subject" (287). 
30. Available from http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/irb/irb_chapter6.htm 
(April 18, 2003). 
31. Donald B. Kohn, "Transduction of CD34( +) Cells from the Bone 
Marrow of HIV-1 Infected Children: Comparative Marking by an RRE 
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Decoy Gene and a Neutral Gene," NIH/RAC Protocol 9602-147. The pro.} 
tocol itself, as well as all relevant documents referred to below, were mad~< 
available as part of the public record at the December 1996 and March l 991f 
RAC meetings. Copies can be requested through the Office 0£ • 
Biotechnology Activities (formerly the Office of Recombinant DNA';'· 
Activities; ORDA) of the National Institutes of Health. The protocol itself;: 
my review, the IRB review, Kathryn Whartenby's letter, the investigator's 
responses to my review and the IRB review, and the then-director of ORDA'a ; 
correspondence with the investigators were included in the materials for the · 
December 1996 meeting of the RAC. My response to the director of ORDA's 
correspondence was included in the meeting materials for the March 1997 , 
meeting of the RAC. Citations to these documents will be included paren-1 
thetically in the text. 
32. My interest in these questions stems from my work with the 
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) of the National Institutes of , 
Health. From June 1995 to June 1998, I had the considerable privilege of 
serving as a member of the RAC. 
3 3. A word may be in order here about the responsibilities of the RAC as 
well as the history and process of consolidated review. At that time, the RAC's l 
charter outlined a broad scope of responsibilities for the committee, all in an 
advisory capacity to the Director of the NIH and the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services. As the 1994 charter stated: 
Function: The Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee shall advise 
the Secretary (Department of Health and Human Services), the 
Assistant Secretary for Health, and the Director, National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), concerning the current state of knowledge and technol-
ogy regarding DNA recombinants, and recommend guidelines to be 
followed by investigators working with recombinant DNA. 
As noted in the NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research (51 
FR 16958), the Director, NIH, must seek the advice of the 
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee before taking the following 
actions: changing containment levels for types of experiments that are 
not explicitly considered in the NIH Guidelines; certifying new host-
vector systems; promulgating and amending a list of classes of recombi-
nant DNA molecules to be exempt from the NIH Guidelines; 
permitting experiments specified by Section III-A of the NIH 
Guidelines; adopting other changes in the NIH Guidelines; interpret-
ing and determining containment levels upon request by the Office of 
Recombinant DNA Activities; revision of the Classification of Etiologic 
Agents for the purposes of the NIH Guidelines. 
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the RAC reviewed all recombinant DNA 
research performed in institutions receiving federal funds for such research. 
Over time, its responsibilities shifted. As data accrued regarding the relative 
safety of such experiments, the RAC rather quickly transferred the bulk of the 
responsibility for review to local institutional biosafety committees. With the 
advent of human gene transfer in 1989, the RAC's attention shifted almost 
exclusively to this new rDNA application. While continuing to advise the NIH 
director about changes in the NIH guidelines concerning containment levels, 
new host-vector systems, and the classification of etiologic agents, the majority 
of its work in the 1990s focused on advising the director whether or not to "per-
mit experiments specified by Section III-A of the NIH Guidelines." 
The RAC provided such advice to the NIH director through protocol 
review. Each human gene transfer protocol submitted to the NIH for fund-
ing was likewise submitted to the RAC. Following the practice established by 
many IRBs, at this time each protocol was assigned to three primary review-
ers, one of whom was to be a "nonscientist"; the reviewers would identify 
questions and issues and lead the discussion of the protocol at one of the 
RAC's quarterly meetings. 
As one can imagine, with the first human gene transfer protocols, this 
process was quite rigorous and careful. Over time, as a base ofknowledge and 
experience had been laid, it was determined that many protocols raised no 
new issues. Using similar vectors, similar clinical procedures, treating the 
same or similar diseases, it seemed unnecessary to devote scarce committee 
time to these protocols. Consequently, in 1995, the RAC instituted a policy 
of "consolidated review." Each protocol submitted to the NIH would contin-
ue to be carefully reviewed by three primary reviewers (one nonscientist), but 
if the reviewers deemed that the protocol presented no new issues or raised 
no concerns, their review was sufficient and the protocol was exempted from 
review by the full committee. If, on the other hand, the reviewers felt the pro-
tocol presented a new methodology or raised clinical, scientific, or ethical 
issues worthy of further discussion, they were to recommend that the proto-
col be reviewed by the full committee at its next meeting. 
34. The institutional IRB approved the protocol only for children aged 
seven years or older. 
35. Upon its initial review, the IRB at the researcher's home institution 
had refused approval, citing a number of reservations in addition to the above 
including: 
This procedure has not been previously performed in humans. 
There is no animal data because there is no animal model of human 
HIV infection. 
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The principal investigator states that this approach is not likely to 
have clinical benefit (Protocol, p. 8). 
The IRB further states: "Discussion arose about the bone marrow aspi-
rate(s) in children for research purposes only. These children would not 
receive this procedure if they were not in the research protoc~l: The ~isk is 
mainly pain, however it does appear to be greater than . mm1mal r.1sk as 
defined in 45 CFR 46.102 .... The investigator does not believe that this pro-
tocol provides significant clinical benefit to the subjects. Thus, one can not 
justify the risks of the bone marrow aspirate(s) based on potential benefits to 
the subject" (Protocol, IRB Review, 10). 
36. As Whartenby notes: "The major issues associated with this protocol 
are of an ethical nature: First, the use of this product in children may not be 
justified, considering the invasiveness of the required procedure~ and their 
associated risks. Although the investigators state that some potential for ben-
efit may exist, there is little proof. The investigators also contend th.at benefit 
may not be observed in adults, but since the purp~s~ of a p~as~ I tnal. shoul? 
be to evaluate toxicity, this point may not be suff1c1ent to Justify testmg this 
product in children" (Memorandum, Katherine A. Whartenby, Ph.D. to 
Philip Noguchi, November 22, 1995). 
37. Scientific indications against prospect of benefit are presented by two 
preclinical/clinical studies the investigators presented in support of the proto-
col. The first is an in vitro study that demonstrates that CD34+ cells can be 
isolated from cord blood and normal bone marrow, can be transduced with 
anti-HIV-I vectors including the vectors proposed for use in this research, that 
these vectors do not interfere with the normal function of the cell, and that 
these vectors significantly suppress the replication of HIV-1 in vitro. This data 
appears strong, except for one point: these in vitro cultures have been selected 
by G4 l 8 for the transduced cells. The suppression of replication of HIV-1 
occurs in cultures where over 70 percent of the cells have been transduced. 
The investigator himself notes that "challenge of cultures with 30-'.1'0 percent 
of the cells transduced, as achieved directly after gene transfer, fails to show 
significant inhibition of HIV-1 probably due to the virus prod.uction by the 
non-transduced cells." One might propose that the latter scenano more close-
ly approximates the in vivo situation. Elsewhere the authors estimate that the 
transduced cells will be present in vivo at a level of 1 in 10,000 or 1 percent. 
The second clinical study cited was the amended SCIO-ADA protocol of 
Dr. Michael Blase, involving the capture of cord blood from newborn pre-
natally diagnosed infants with SCIO. This cord blood was subjected ~o a 
similar protocol to that proposed here: the ADA gene was transduced mto 
hematopoetic stem cells, which were reinfused into the patients. This study 
demonstrated that the transduced cells would engraft and that from a very 
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small (in fact undetectable) number of transduced stem cells, the immune 
systems of these patients could be reconstituted. It is this study that demon-
strated the presence of transduced PBMCs at a level of 1 in 10,000 or 
CD34( +) cells at a level of 1 percent after one year. Yet the investigators' 
conclusions regarding the effects of gene expression at these levels were 
unclear. While this protocol seemed to alleviate concerns surrounding the 
risks of reinfusion of transduced cells, only three children had been enrolled 
at that time. 
Furthermore, even if this small number of transduced cells in the SCID-
ADA protocol was to be demonstrated to have a clinically significant effect, 
the mechanism of effect for SCIO-ADA and HIV-1 inhibition seemed to be 
markedly different. If the desired outcome was the production of a missing 
protein, a cell population of I percent might be ~dequate. to produce suffi-
cient quantities of the needed enzyme. However, 1f the desired outcome was 
to repopulate the immune system through cell replication, a starting point of 
I percent cell population seemed to have a different significance. 
The investigators raised further questions regarding the significance of the 
SCIO-ADA study to support the claim to prospect of benefit in their article 
entitled "Engraftment of Gene-Modified Umbilical Cord Blood Cells in 
Neonates with Adenosine Deaminase Deficiency," Nature Medicine 1:10 
( 1995), which was included as supporting material for the protocol. Here 
they stated: "The frequency of vector-containing progenitor cells exceeds by 
100-fold the frequency of vector-containing cells in the mature haematopo-
etic cell compartments. The explanation for this dichotomy is unknown. 
Potentially, the expression of the ADA gene is beneficial for progenitor cell 
proliferation and allows expansion of the committed DC34+ progenitor pool 
in a fashion similar to that expected for T-lymphoid progenitors. However, 
the relatively high frequency of progenitor cells containing the vector is not 
reflected in mature leukocytes .... This observation suggests that although 
primitive progenitor cells may engraft without cytoablative therapy, they fail 
to undergo complete maturation in vivo. Alternatively the presence of the 
vector may interfere with mature haematopoietic cell production. Some 
reports have suggested that the neomycin phosphotransferase gene (neo) may 
impair hematopoietic cell function" (1021). . . 
Thus information from the SCIO-ADA study, coupled with questions 
from in vitro data on the replication of HIV-I in a culture of 40 percent trans-
duced cells, seems to argue against the anticipation of "prospect" of benefit 
for the children enrolled. 
38. It appears that it was on the basis of these two responses and the claims 
outlined in note 43 below that the IRB at the investigator's home institution 
finally approved the protocol. 
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39. Janofsky and Starfield, "Assessment of Risk in Research on Children." 
For further description of the wide variability in the assessment of "minimal 
risk" with regard to protocols involving children, see Benjamin Freedman, ' 
Abraham Fuks, and Charles Weijer, "In Loco Parentis: Minimal Risk as an 
Ethical Threshold for Research upon Children,'' Hastings Center Report 23 
(1993):13-19; and Saul Krugman's defense of the Willowbrook Hepatitis 
Study in Krugman, "The Willowbrook Hepatitis Studies Revisited: Ethical 
Aspects," Reviews of Infectious Diseases 8 ( 1986): 157-62. 
40. I was concerned that I was perhaps allowing the names of the proce-
dures to weigh more heavily in my assessment of their risk than they warrant-
ed. Therefore, in the process of my initial review, I consulted a handful of 
individuals and colleagues in the field of pediatrics familiar with the issues of 
research on children. When asked whether they would consider bone mar-
row aspirations and harvests in children a procedure entailing only a "minor 
increa.se over minimal risk," the almost unanimous opinion was that the bone 1 
marrow procedures themselves entailed significantly "greater than minimal 
risk." This is certainly not a scientific sample, but it did address the concern 
about clinical versus lay perceptions. 
41. In my review, I suggested possible alternatives. The investigators 
themselves had noted that certain scientific questions might be addressed in 
SIV or SCIO/nu mice (Protocol, p. 88). They did not, however, elaborate or 
show that these experiments had been conducted. I also proposed that, given 
the information they provided about the physiology of pediatric HIV, an argu-
ment might be made for initially attempting this approach in HIV-positive 
newborns using retrieved umbilical cord blood and either proceeding within 
the neonatal period or waiting to see whether or not these infants serocon-
vert. This approach would test a number of the same concepts and greatly 
minimize the risk and burden associated with the bone marrow process. 
42. If one concludes that these children will most likely not benefit direct-
ly from this research, there are still two additional justifications for research 
on children that must be considered. The first would be that children are the 
only population in which this particular condition is found. While that is the 
case for a disease like SCIO or PNP-deficiency, it is not the case for HIV. 
Alternatively, one could argue that the physiology of children is sufficient-
ly different from that of other human populations that research on, for exam-
ple, adults will not provide helpful information. This argument is made by 
the investigator. He states in response to the IRB critique that pediatric HIV 
infection must be studied in children for four reasons: "(l) Pediatric AIDS 
has a number of unique clinical aspects and therefore the efficacy of gene 
therapy for HIV-1 infected children cannot adequately be studied in adults, 
(2) the procedure may only be effective or be more effective in young chil-
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dren (e.g., <12 years old) because the level of thymic function which would 
be needed for the transduced CD34+ cells to become functional T lympho-
cytes is greatest earliest in life (emphasis mine); and (3) gene transfer into 
CD34+ cells is most effective with younger donors. [Therefore], it may be 
possible that these methods would fail to show efficacy in adults and yet be 
beneficial if applied to children" (Protocol, Response to IRB, 15). 
A number of problems are presented by this claim. First, the investigator 
makes this claim solely in the context of the response to IRB critique; except 
for the first point above (which is not elaborated upon), the investigator does 
not raise these issues in the context of the protocol. Moreover, neither in the 
response nor in the protocol does the investigator provide any citations or 
data in support of these claims. He states that pediatric HIV infection is 
unique, but does not say how. He does address the second point in the proto-
col, but the claim is different; he states that "thymic functions, which may be 
necessary for stem cells to undergo differentiation to mature T lymphocytes, 
is likely to be best early in the disease course" (emphasis mine, Protocol, 33). 
This is a different claim. Nor is data included on the relationship between 
age and CD34+ cell transduction. 
Whartenby also raises concerns relevant to these claims. As she notes: 
"The investigators would like to test this product in children because of their 
less developed immune system, but the protocol is written for patients aged 
3-18. This age span seems to encompass more than one patient population, 
since the immune system of an 18-year-old should be more similar to that of 
an adult than that of a 3-year-old. Use of the older group may be more ethi-
cal, but may not provide any more information than use in adults. It is not 
clear how this group should be divided or how the issue of an appropriate age 
group should be handled" (Whartenby memorandum). This issue becomes 
more complicated by the IRB amendment that the patient population be 
restricted to children aged seven or older. Many of these children might well 
not be "early in the disease course." 
Finally, the investigator's third claim above is problematic as well: it cer-
tainly may be the case that a given procedure fails to show efficacy in adults 
but is beneficial in children. But the investigator does not provide data to 
indicate that this approach has been tried in adults and has failed. It may in 
fact be the case that this approach could be tried in adults and might work. 
This would provide clinical data which could be useful in informing a pedi-
atric protocol. 
43. The end of the narrative of this particular protocol may be of interest 
to some. As noted above, I had submitted my review on December 4, 1995. 
On February 1, 1996, I received via fax, the investigator's response to my 
questions and critiques. Then, on approximately February 5, RAC members 
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received notice that the March 1996 meeting had been canceled, ostensi• 
bly due to "lack of protocols to discuss." It seemed apparent that my recom~ 
mendation had been overturned and the decision about the protocol had , 
been made. On February 8, however, I received a phone call from Dr. , 
Nelson Wivel, then-director of ORDA. As quickly became clear, Dr. Wivel 
was calling to urge me to reconsider my recommendation that the protocol 
go before the entire committee. Playing the card of the urgency of pediatric . 
HIV research, he made it clear to me that he had greater expertise regard- · 
ing issues related to research involving children and that my concern was, 
frankly, out of line. I made it clear to Dr. Wivel that I understood the justi• 
fications and parameters for nonbeneficial research involving pediatric sub-
jects, especially in the case of lethal diseases, but I also made it quite cleat 
that I was not convinced that the HIV protocol met established guidelines , 
for the ethical conduct of such research. I reiterated that I had reviewed the 
investigator's materials and responses thoroughly, that I had conducted a 
significant amount of outside research into this question specifically in 
light of this protocol, and that because of this research, I remained con-
vinced that the protocol deserved consideration by the full RAC. I also stat-
ed that, as I had just been informed that the March meeting had been 
canceled, it seemed obvious that the decision about this protocol had 
already been made and that my comments and position were no longer rel-
evant. I told him, nonetheless, that my own opinion remained unchanged. 
The phone call ended. 
Since the RAC did not meet again until December 1996, it was not until 
this meeting that documents relevant to this protocol were made part of the 
public record and circulated to members of the RAC. In those materials, 
appended to the protocol, was a letter from Dr. Wivel to the principal inves· 
tigator, dated February 8, 1996, the day of our phone conversation. Wivel 
herein stated: 
I apologize for the somewhat prolonged delay in responding to your let-
ter and the significant amount of information that you presented in 
response to the comments of Dr. Lysaught. As I think that you are well 
aware, the two scientific reviewers of your protocol made the judgment 
that it should be exempt from RAC review .... Your materials were for-
warded to Dr. Lysaught for her review. Subsequently I had the oppor-
tunity to speak to her, and it is my assumption that she has a clearer 
concept of the necessity for Phase I trials involving pediatric research 
subjects who have lethal diseases, notwithstanding the fact that there 
may be no benefit to a particular subject. After careful evaluation of all 
the available information, it has been determined that the protocol ... 
is exempt from RAC review. 
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I had not been copied on this letter. One of my scientific colleagues on 
the RAC, who found the tenor of the correspondence rather problematic, 
brought it to my attention. My written response to this letter was made part 
of the public record in the materials of the March 1997 RAC meeting. 
44. Again, for more on this, see Churchill, et al., "Genetic Research as 
Therapy"; and Lysaught, "Commentary: Reconstruing Genetic Research as 
Research." 
45. Information emerging from the continued inquiry into the practices 
surrounding Jesse Gelsinger's death reveal what has been characterized as a 
"95 percent failure rate" in the reporting of adverse events from investigators 
conducting clinical trials of human gene transfer involving adenoviral vec-
tors; see Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Agency Failed to Monitor Patients in Gene 
Research," New York Times, (February 2, 2000). The University of 
Pennsylvania, in its official response to the RAC/FDA findings released in 
December 1999, characterized the failures in their program as "little more 
than 'minor deviations' in bookkeeping"; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Scientists 
Defend Suspended Gene Therapy," New York Times, (February 15, 2000). 
46. See Stuart H. Orkin and Arno G. Motulsky, National Institutes of 
Health Ad Hoc Committee Report, Report and Recommendations of the 
Panel to Assess the N.I.H. Investment in Research on Gene Therapy 
(December 7, 1995), available from http://www.nih.gov/news/panelrep.html. 
47. Paul Gelsinger, Jesse's father, reports that "he and his son had no idea 
there were risks" entailed in the procedure and were not informed of adverse 
events that had occurred with other subjects. Moreover, he reports that he 
was told by an investigator involved with the protocol that "the treatment was 
already working in some patients"; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Youth's Death 
Shaking Up Field of Gene Experiments on Humans," New York Times, 
(January 27, 2000). The FDA/NIH investigation revealed that "the informed 
consent form that the investigators gave patients deviated from the one the 
agency [the FDA] had approved, in that it omitted information about the 
death of monkeys that had received treatment similar to that given Mr. 
Gelsinger, although much more powerful"; Stolberg, "FDA Officials Fault 
Penn Team in Gene Therapy Death"). 
48. The Orkin/Motulsky Report (see note 46 above) was issued in 
December 1995, at about the time the decision was made to abolish the RAC. 
49. Eliot Marshall, "Varmus Proposes to Scrap the RAC," Science 272 
(1996):94 (emphasis added). 
50. This point was also relevant to the HIV protocol. The investigator 
noted that 80 percent of the pediatric AIDS population is African American 
or Latino and that 75 percent of the younger patients followed at the investi-
gator's institution were likewise African American or Latino. This raises social 
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and ethical questions regarding whether children who are possibly already 
doubly disadvantaged- socioeconomically and by their disease -are being 1 
asked to assume an additional undue burden of non beneficial research. It ill 
a catch-22 (if research is not conducted, this disadvantaged population is fur.- •· 
ther disadvantaged by this terrible disease) unless clinical trials are designed · 
with a serious prospect of benefit. 
51. Available from http://ohrp/osophs.dhhs.gov/irb/irb_chapter6.htrn ~ 
(April 18, 2003). 
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Science, Ethics, and Policy: 
Relating Human Genomics to 
Embryonic Stem-Cell Research 
and Therapeutic Cloning 
Gerard Magill, Ph.D. 
THIS CHAPTER discusses a value-based connection between the emerg-
ing technologies of human genomics, embryonic stem-cell research, 
and therapeutic cloning. The goal is to provide an ethics analysis that 
seeks to promote and protect society's interests in the current environ-
ment of scientific progress and technological breakthroughs. 
To set the scene of the emerging capacity of bioengineering today, 
I present a case study into the treatment of Molly and Adam Nash, the 
first documented medical therapy to combine human genomics and 
embryonic stem-cell research. My argument is that human life consti-
tutes the most basic human value that must permeate an ethical analy-
sis of life sciences research today. The emphasis on the value of 
human life is evident in both human genomics and embryonic stem-
cell research, including therapeutic cloning. The breakthroughs in 
human genomics raise many ethics concerns. But the first death of a 
patient in a gene therapy trial in 1999 gave prominence to a profound 
concern about patient safety in human genomics research. Second, 
the announcement by President Bush in August 200 I permitting fed-
eral funding of research on a limited number of embryonic stem cells 
generated widespread debate about the meaning of embryonic human 
life. Moreover, dubious claims about a private cloning company 
called Clonaid having cloned human babies in late 2002 and early 
2003 have heightened the rhetoric of policy discussion about embry-
onic stem-cell research and human cloning. 1 Despite such claims, sci-
ence continues to encounter such serious difficulties with cloning 
